S.B. Civil Arbitration Application No.50/2016 {23.11.2017-(Reportable)} – 

Disposition: Application dismissed 

Learned counsel for the respondent :- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: How so ever the petitioner may argue about the oral agreement subsequent to written MOU, as held by catena of decisions referred to above, oral evidence of intention is not admissible in evidence for interpreting covenants of the deed. When wordings in deed are clear, subsequent conduct of the parties is irrelevant consideration. Actual value of the land, which was declared as the price in terms of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, has to be taken into consideration and no evidence as to socalled oral agreement contrary to that can be accepted, at least for the purpose of Section 11 of the Act of 1996

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 174/2000 (13.04.2017-RAJHC) (MANU/RH/0210/2017) –

Disposition: Petition Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: “Rule 42 of the ITBP Rules of 1994, is of mandatory form and the word “may” used therein means “shall” and the respondents could not have conducted summary force court in a case where the offence is said to have been committed by a personnel of ITBP along with any other person not subject to the ITBP Act whose identity is known or where offence is committed by him while on leave or during absence without leave.

SAW-1396/2012 MANU/RH/0829/2016 (27.09.2016- RAJHC) 

Disposition: Appeal Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Appellant:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: “The Apex Court in the judgment Dt. 21-4-2016 (supra), observed that the distinction introduced by the learned Single Judge of the candidates who approached the Court on or before 9- 11-2011 or thereafter does not hold a valid reasoning and is not sustainable in law at the same time granted liberty to the intervenors to work out their remedy before the High Court in tune with the principle laid down and the conclusion as well as the result arrived at in the Civil Appeals and in our considered view the present appellants being similarly situated are entitled to claim parity and the formula arrived at by the learned Single Judge in its order Dt. 9-11-2011 deserves to be applied in rem to the candidates who had participated in the selection process & the submission made by the counsel for the Corporation that the principle laid down by the Apex Court remained confined to the candidates who at once appointed & later on terminated alike that of Hanuman Singh approached the Apex Court, such defence is wholly without substance and in our considered view after the sacrosanct date 9-11-2011 has been considered by the Apex Court of which we have made a reference, does not hold a valid reasoning, leaves no manner of doubt that the candidates who had participated in the selection process are at par and we are of the view that the terms which were consented by the Corporation and recorded by the learned Single Judge in its order Dt. 9-11-2011 will indeed be applicable in rem to the candidates who had participated in the selection process initiated pursuant to the advertisement in question.

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4445/1998 (Date of decision: 20/01/2017) 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: “In the cases where the courts are concerned with the judicial view of the administrative action, the parameters within which the action can be reviewed by the Courts are well settled. No doubt, the scope of Judicial review is limited and the courts do not go into the merits of the decision taken by the administrative authorities but are concerned with the decision making process. Interference with the order of the administrative authority is permissible when it is found to be irrational, unreasonable or there is procedural impropriety. However, where reasonable conduct is expected, the criteron of reasonableness is not subjective but objective, albeit the onus of establishment of unreasonableness rests upon the person challenging the validity of the acts. It is also trite that while exercising limited power of judicial review on the grounds mentioned above, the court can examine whether administrative decisions in exercise of powers, even if conferred in subjective terms are made in good faith and on relevant considerations.

S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 2429/2015 

Decided On: 06.01.2016 

Disposition: Allowed  Learned counsel for the

Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: The question would be as to whether FIR can be quashed on the grounds urged by learned counsel for petitioner. The FIR can be quashed if it does not disclose any offence on the face of it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. 14. The offence under Section 13(d) is also not made out. The offence under Section 13(d) is made out when fact regarding demand and acceptance of pecuniary advantage is established. It is not available in the present case. The Apex Court recently in the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. The Dist. Inspector of Police & Anr., reported in MANU/SC/1012/2015 : (2015) 10 SCC 152 held that for making out offence under Section 13(d), the demand as well as acceptance of bribe or ratification is a precondition, 15. It is not a case where the allegation exists regarding demand and acceptance of pecuniary advantage or bribe by the petitioner. The offence under Section 13(d) is not made out even on the face of it, if the FIR is perused.

Board of Revenue and Ors. (18.11.2015 – RAJHC): MANU/RH/1965/2015 

Disposition: Disposed Off 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: In view of emphatic pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane (Dead) by LRS. & Ors. (supra), this Court is of the view that issue of adoption could not be determined by the Revenue Court alone.

 (22.05.2014 – RAJHC) :MANU/RH/1861/2014 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: Sub-section 2 of Section 17 of Act of 1994 requires appointment by notification in the official gazette. Sub-section 3 of Section 17 of the Act of 1994 refers about composition of appropriate authority. If the reply submitted by the respondents along with documents are looked into, gazette notification for appointment of Chairperson was issued on 27th January, 2010 but no gazette notification has been filed for appointment of the members of State Appropriate Authority, though the notifications have been enclosed along with reply to show their appointment but there is nothing on record to show its publication in the gazette, if it was made. 10. In view of the above, it cannot be said to be appointment of appropriate authority in accordance to the provisions of law.

(06.02.2014 – RAJHC) :MANU/RH/0698/2014 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: The Full bench of Calcutta High Court in Mahesh Kumar Sarda @ Maheswari v. Union of India reported as MANU/WB/0376/2000 : 2000 (4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 129 : 2000 Criminal Law Journal Volume 106 Page 2951 has also held that High Court has a jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail (transit bail) to the limited extent even in an outstation case. 20. Section 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also recognise the concept of transit bail. 21. There is no contrary judgment to the view taken by the Single Judge of this Court. Hence, this Court is bound by the judgment of this Court. 22. Consequently, taking the nature of allegations, the fact that FIR pertains to the year 2011 and the judgment rendered by Single Judge of this Court in Mahesh Kumar Sharma’s case (supra), prayer made by the petitioner is accepted and transit bail for a period of seven days commencing from today is granted to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy by approaching the concerned Court at Madhya Pradesh. In the event of arrest, petitioner shall be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer

(19.05.2012 – RAJHC) [2013(3) RLW 2644 (Raj.) MANU/RH/1462/2012 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: (1) The CBI is directed that they will investigate the matters fairly, properly and impartially and submit the progress report before the court concerned. (2) The Director CBI is directed to monitor the investigation in the case.

(27.10.2009-RAJHC) :MANU/RH/1402/2009 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: 29. Article 238 of the Constitution of India has become redundant, as indicated above and Article 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India have been considered by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Singh (supra) in para 17 and it has been held that the Judicial Service Rules entrust the function of conducting examinations to the Commission. The Judicial Service Rules do not prescribe the manner and procedure for holding the examination and evaluation of answer scripts and award of the final marks and declaration of the results. Therefore, it is for the Commission to regulate the manner in which it will conduct the examination and value the answer-scripts subject, however, to the provisions of the Judicial Service Rules. If the Commission has made Rules to regulate the procedure and conduct of the examination, they will naturally apply to any examination conducted by it for recruitment to any service, including the Judicial Service. But where the Judicial Service Rules make a specific provision in regard to any aspect of examination, such provision will prevail, and the provisions of the PSC Procedure Rules, to the extent it is inconsistent with the Judicial Service Rules, will be inapplicable and further held that the field is occupied by Rule 20(3) and Note(i) of Appendix-II which will prevail over the general provision under Rule 51 of the UP Public Service Commission Rules.

22.05.2009 MANU/RH/0129/2009 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: It is, indeed, a settled principle of law that once the law prescribes a procedure, then the competent authority is legally bound to adhere to the said procedure. In the present case under Rule 26(1) of the Rules, the respondents were legally bound to send a notice to the petitioner, however, they failed to do so. Therefore, the procedure has been flouted by the respondents. Since, the pre-condition of Rule 26(1) has not been fulfilled, the power under Rule 26(3) of the Rules could not be invoked for dismissing the application. Therefore, clearly the order dated 10-8-2007 is not only arbitrary, unfair and unjust, but it is also patently illegal.

(03.08.2005- RAJHC) MANU/RH/0368/2005 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: 33. In view of the discussions made above, there will be no need at all to issue any general directions for prisoners who stand convicted of offence, which finds mentioned in Category ‘B’. We direct that matters should be left to the decision of the Judges to whom application for bail is made. We, however, direct that the appeals filed by such persons in which bail is denied, should be accorded priority in hearing. Prisoners belonging to Category ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ need to be enlarged on bail or their sentences need to be suspended if they have undergone at least five years of imprisonment in which at least three years should be after conviction, if they might make an application for the same. The same principle ought to apply to those convicted by court martial and such prisoners should also be entitled to be released after seeking suspension of their sentence. The period of five years should be reduced to four years for female and minors, with at least two years of imprisonment after conviction. We clarify that these directions shall not be applicable in cases where the very grant of bail is forbidden by law. The directions made above, besides being applicable to all the prisoners of category ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’, shall also be applicable to those convicted Under Section 304B IPC. Let all these matters be now placed for hearing in view guidelines, as fully detailed above.

(21.03.2005-RAJHC) :MANU/RH/0223/2005 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: 1. Hence the direction sought by the petitioner for granting the relief in terms of the award cannot be denied to him as it would not be in the interest of justice to direct the petitioner to take recourse to the provisions under the industrial Disputes Act as he cannot get the relief in terms of the award merely by prosecuting the Officers. Therefore while an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, the relief of the award in actual terms which has been granted to the petitioner by the Labour Court, cannot be denied to him on the ground that he has a remedy under the Act of 1947 to prosecute the officers who fail to give effect to the award. The Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is competent and would be well within its jurisdiction to issue appropriate relief in the nature of writs, if it is satisfied that denial of the relief would result into grave miscarriage of justice.

(23.11.2004-RAJHC) :MANU/RH/0499/2004 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: 38. As per Order 8 Rule 9 no pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to set-off or counter-claim shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit; but the Court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time of not more than thirty days for presenting the same. 39. The petitioner had the opportunity to move before the trial by set-off counter claim and move to seek leave from the Trial Court to place the document on record. By bare perusal of Rule 9 reveals that no written statement or counter claim can be accepted without seeking prior leave from the Court. 40. Similarly as the petitioner has not submitted particulars and documents along with the application and only filed an affidavit of his daughter, which is not found sufficient to show the reason, which is not found sufficient to show the reason, which prevents the petitioner not to file the written statement well within time. As per Rule 6 of Order 8 the particulars of set-off to be given in written statement.

(03.10.2001-RAJHC) MANU/RH/0739/2001 

Disposition: Allowed

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: In view of these infirmities, we are satisfied that the dying declaration Ex.P.22, is satisfied that the dying declaration Ex.P. 22, is a highly suspicious document and we are unable to place reliance on it. 13. The approach of the trial Court in our opinion has been on an infirm footing and the evidence has not been scrutinised in its proper light. In order to pass the test of reliability a dying declaration has to be subjected to the strict scrutiny and the closest circumspection. In the instant case, when the dying declaration was recorded in the circumstances which do not inspire confidence, we would be most reluctant to convict the appellants.

(26.04.200- RAJHC) :MANU/RH/0339/2001 

Disposition: Allowed 

Learned counsel for the Petitioner:- Mr. Rajeev Surana, Advocate 

Held: We are in entire agreement with the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge in the case of Smt. Snehlata Mathur vs. State (supra) and as upheld by the Division Bench of this Court. The judgment rendered by the Single Bench and also by the Division Bench, in the above case, has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the SLP at the admission stage. We also fully endorse the view expressed by the Division Bench in Habbibur Rehman’s case (supra) and the Interpretation given by the Division Bench. The withdrawal of selection grade, in our opinion, is not proper. The petitioners in all these cases shall be entitled for grant of selection grade and after having granted the selection grade, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Department, the selection grade will be issued without issuing any show cause notice to any of the petitioners after five years of such sanction. As rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the case of Smt. Annama Chako vs. State & Ors. (supra), as it involves the basic rights, involving civil consequences, the Selection Grade could not have been withdrawn except by issuing a show cause notice. We, therefore, held that the action of the respondents was violative of principles of natural justice and could not be sustained in the eyes of law. We make it clear that now as we have quashed the impugned action of the Government in each case, the respondents are not permitted to initiate recovery proceedings. In case, any recovery has already been made, the recovered amount shall be refunded to the petitioner concerned. It is brought to our notice that on account of the impugned circular, the pay scale has been reduced to some of the petitioners. In view of the order, now passed by us in this batch of writ petitions, the pay scale is also to be revised to those teachers whose pay structure has been reduced in view of the impugned circular and the arrears may be paid to the concerned petitioners within three months from the receipt of certified copy of this order